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In the middle of the 20th century, it was a common Wittgenstein-inspired idea in philosophy that 
for a linguistic expression to have a meaning is for it to be governed by a rule of use.1 In other 
words, it was widely believed that meanings are to be identified with use-conditions. For example, 
here’s Peter Strawson in his “On Referring” (my emphasis, here and hereafter): 
  
The meaning of an expression cannot be identified with the object it is used, on a particular 
occasion, to refer to. The meaning of a sentence cannot be identified with the assertion it is used, 
on a particular occasion, to make. For to talk about the meaning of an expression or sentence is 
not to talk about its use on a particular occasion, but about the rules, habits, conventions 
governing its correct use, on all occasions, to refer or to assert. (Strawson 1950: 328).  
 
Unfortunately, neither Strawson nor many others went much past such general remarks in 
developing the idea further.2 This led other philosophers to view it as unclear and somewhat 
mysterious.  
 Even worse, in the 1960’s and 1970’s the idea that meaningfulness is a matter of being 
governed by rules of use came to be associated with two spurious views. On the one hand, due to 
Michael Dummett’s employment of it in defense of his anti-realist or justification-conditional 
views, it came to be viewed as an alternative to, and inconsistent with mainstream realist, truth-
 
1 It’s a matter of some controversy what Wittgenstein himself thought about the relation between meaning and rules 
of use (see Glüer & Wikforss 2009). 
 
2 For more remarks like these see the quotes by Gilbert Ryle, Patrick Nowell-Smith, Geoffrey Warnock, and others in 
the beginning of William Alston’s paper “Meaning and Use” (Alston 1963). Alston’s paper and Erik Stenius’s “Mood 
and the Language-Game” (Stenius 1967) are among the few attempts to develop the idea more rigorously, but 
unfortunately neither had much impact beyond the fact that the latter served as a source of inspiration for Lewis’s 
influential convention-based view (Lewis 1975: 7, fn. 2). Alston eventually also wrote a book on the subject in the 




conditional approaches (Dummett 1991, 1993). On the other hand, it came to be seen as associated 
with non-cognitivist views which are subject to the so-called Frege-Geach problem with 
compositionality (Geach 1960, 1965, Searle 1962). 
 In 1980’s and 1990’s the idea that meaningfulness has to do with rules of use reappeared 
in work on context-sensitivity. For example, here are David Kaplan in “Demonstratives”, John 
Perry in “Indexicals and demonstratives”, and Scott Soames in Beyond Rigidity: 
 
Among the pure indexicals are ‘I’, ‘now’, ‘here’ (in one sense), ‘tomorrow’ and others. The 
linguistic rules which govern their use fully determine the referent for each context. … The 
linguistic rules which govern the use of the true demonstratives ‘that’, ‘he’, etc. are not 
sufficient to determine their referent in all contexts of use. (Kaplan 1989a: 490-491) 
 
Meaning, as I shall use the term, is a property of expressions—that is of types rather than tokens 
or utterances. Meaning is what is fixed by the conventions for the use of expressions that we 
learn when we learn a language. … To repeat, as I use the terms, meaning is what the rules of 
language associate with simple and complex expressions.... (Perry 1997: 587) 
 
[D]ifferent indexicals typically have different meanings in the sense of being associated with 
different rules governing their use that must be grasped by the competent users of the language 
(Soames 2002: 103). 
 
Unfortunately, despite saying things like the above, Kaplan, Perry, and Soames didn’t go past such 
general remarks in developing the idea either and instead did descriptive semantics in terms of 
what they thought of as formal substitutes like characters, functions from contexts thought of as 
n-tuples to contents.3 Again, this led other philosophers to view it as vague and mysterious. For 
example, here’s a quote from Jason Stanley’s survey article “Philosophy of Language in the 
Twentieth Century” that we can take as emblematic of such an attitude:  
  
 
3 One mainstream philosopher of language who has perhaps always held the view that meaning is to be thought in 
terms of rules of use and use-conditions is Francois Recanati (Recanati 1987, 1998, 2018). However, even he hasn’t 
developed the view in detail. 
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Whereas the notion of a rule of use is vague and mystical, Kaplan’s notion of the character of 
an expression is not only clear, but set theoretically explicable in terms of fundamental semantic 
notions. (Stanley 2008: 418) 
 
Consequently, it is currently relatively absent from mainstream discussion.4 
 My aim in this paper is to reinvigorate the idea that meaningfulness is a matter of being 
governed by rules of use and meanings are best thought of in terms of use-conditions. I will do this 
by doing three things. First, and most importantly, I’ll develop it into the Rule-Governance view 
of the nature of linguistic meaningfulness, thereby showing that it can be de-mystified. Second, 
I’ll show that the view isn’t by itself inconsistent with truth-conditional approaches nor subject to 
the Frege-Geach problem. Finally, I’ll explain why the idea has had a lasting appeal to 
philosophers from Strawson to Kaplan and why we should find it continually attractive. 
 I will proceed as follows. I’ll start by making precise the question I take our idea to be an 
answer to by distinguishing it from more familiar questions in descriptive semantics and 
foundational semantics (Section 1). Next, I’ll develop the idea into the Rule-Governance view 
(Sections 2-3). Thereafter, I’ll show that it’s not subject to either of the two problems (Sections 4-
5). Finally, I’ll explain its lasting appeal and demonstrate its attractiveness (Section 6).    
 
1. The Nature of Meaningfulness  
 
Some propositions are true, some things are good, and some mental states represent the world as 




4 Three points. First, there are notable exceptions at the margins. For example, the view is discussed and employed in 
David Kaplan’s unpublished paper “The Meaning of Ouch!’ and ‘Oops!” that has been circulating for at least 20 years 
and that has influenced others in developing their views of the use-conditional dimension of meaning (Kaplan MS, 
Gutzmann 2015, Potts 2005, Predelli 2013). Second, the view has always been taken more seriously by those 
developing or discussing alternative approaches. For example, something like it has been presupposed by Robert 
Brandom in his development of inferentialism (Brandom 1994). Similarly, it has been employed by Mark Schroeder 
in his work on expressivism and Amie Thomasson in her defense of easy ontology and a normativist view of modality 
(Schroeder 2008, Thomasson 2014, 2020). Finally, the situation insofar as meaning stands in stark contrast to speech 
act theory where Tim Williamson’s view that the illocutionary act of assertion can be understood in terms of a 




(Nature of Truth)   What is it for a proposition to be true? 
(Nature of Goodness)  What is it for something to be good? 
(Nature of Representation) What is it for a mental state to represent? 
 
Such questions are questions about the nature or essence of truth, goodness, and representation, 
calling for a reductive analysis of the target property in terms of something else. One can react to 
them in one of two ways. First, one can reject the question and claim that truth, goodness, or 
representation is a primitive property that doesn’t admit of a reductive analysis. Second, one can 
try to answer the question by reducing them to something else.5 
 Here’s a similar pre-theoretic fact: some strings of symbols have a meaning in a particular 
language whereas others do not. For example, the expression ‘Bertrand is British’ has a meaning 
in English, but not in Esperanto while the mere string of symbols ‘*#&’ doesn’t have a meaning 
in either. Furthermore, some expressions have multiple meanings or are ambiguous in a language 
and some expressions have the same meaning as others or are synonymous with them. For 
example, ‘Bertrand went to the bank’ has multiple meanings in English and ‘Bertrand is a doctor’ 
is synonymous with ‘Bertrand is a physician’. This invites an analogous philosophical question:  
 
(Nature of Meaningfulness) What is it for a linguistic expression to have a meaning in a 
     language? 
 
This is a question about the nature or essence of having meaning or meaningfulness, calling for a 
reductive analysis of it in terms of something else.6 
 To understand the question better, we need to say just a bit more about what we have in 
mind by linguistic expressions, meaning, and language.  
 
5 For primitivism about truth see Davidson 1996. For primitivism about goodness see Moore 1903, for reductivism 
Finlay 2014. For discussion about primitivism about representation see Boghossian 1989; for discussion of reductivist 
options see Greenberg 2014. 
 
6 This question is frequently construed as a question about what it is for expressions to stand in a putative meaning-
relation to some entities thought of as meanings (e. g. Horwich 1998: 4, 14-15, Schiffer 2003). This assumes what I 
call the Object Model on which having a meaning is analogous to having, say, a cellphone, that is, standing in a 
possession-relation to an object. In my opinion implicit acceptance of this picture has done serious harm in restricting 
people’s imagination about how to think about meaningfulness and meanings. In any case, nothing in the above 
question itself forces such a construal and I much prefer the Property Model on which having a meaning is analogous 
to having a color, that is, having a property.  
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 Let’s call a string of symbols something that has phonetic and/or orthographic properties. 
Both ‘Bertrand is British’ and ‘*#&’ are strings. Strings are “types” and must be distinguished 
from their particular uses, events of producing utterances or inscriptions which are standardly 
thought of as their “tokens”.7 A linguistic expression is a string of symbols that has furthermore 
syntactic properties and one or more meanings in some language. Expressions are therefore also 
types and must be distinguished from both their uses and tokens. Consequently, the above question 
is a question about the linguistic meanings of types, what’s sometimes called their context-
invariant or standing  or timeless meanings, not about the meaning-related or “semantic” properties 
of uses of expressions on particular occasions and with certain intentions etc. For example, it’s a 
question about the meanings of the words ‘I’, ‘this’, and ‘safe’ versus the related properties of their 
uses in the sentences ‘I am a philosopher’, ‘This is nicer than this’, and ‘The beach is safe’ on 
particular occasions with particular intentions etc.8 
 By an expression’s meaning in a language I mean what fully competent speakers of the 
language have a grasp of in virtue of their semantic competence (Dummett 1993, Higginbotham 
1992). It is what language-learners aim to grasp. And it is what makes it possible for the competent 
speakers to use that expression to speak that language and perform meaning-related speech acts 
like saying something, asking questions, or telling someone to do something.9 For example, the 
meaning of ‘Bertrand is British’ is what competent speakers of English have a grasp of and that 
makes it possible for them to use that expression to speak English and to say that Bertrand is 
British. Thus, the above question is a question about what it is for expressions qua types to have 
 
7 I use scare quotes above to indicate that I intend a non-committal reading of the type-token terminology. As I use it, 
it leaves open what one takes the “types” to be and how they’re supposed to relate to the “tokens”. The most common 
view, of course, is that word-types are kinds and tokens are their instances. However, one might think that words are 
individuals and their uses consist in production of physical entities that serve as their perceptible proxies or 
representations. Following Zoltan Szabo, I think that this can still be put in the type-token terminology, perhaps with 
some strain, by saying that on this view word-types are individuals and tokens are their representations (Szabo 1999). 
In any case, nothing I say here should depend on the correct ontology of words. 
 
8 For an insightful recent discussion of how to think of the relations between the meanings of expressions qua types 
vis-à-vis the related properties of their uses on particular occasions see Recanati 2018. 
 
9 Austin called such meaning-related speech acts like saying something, asking a question or telling someone to do 
something locutionary acts, distinguishing them from the further illocutionary acts that one performs in performing 
the former like asserting, conjecturing, predicting, inquiring, requesting, ordering etc. (Austin 1962, for some 
discussion and defense of the distinction see Recanati 1987). In contrast, others like Searle and Alston would think of 
them as generic or determinable illocutionary acts. 
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the properties in a language that fully competent speakers have a grasp of, and that make it possible 
for them to use the expression to speak the language.  
 By a language I mean some sort of public, communal, or, minimally shared entity, a 
sociolect rather than an idiolect. I find it natural to think of them as historically embedded, ongoing 
social practices (Dummett 1991: Ch. 4, Jackman 1999, Ridge 2020). 
Thus, the question about the nature of meaningfulness is a question about what it is for 
expressions qua types to have the properties that competent speakers have a grasp of in language 
like English.10 
 Now, in comparison to the questions about the nature of truth, goodness, and even 
representation, the question about the nature of meaningfulness is relatively neglected. This might 
sound absurd given all the work done in philosophy of language, but once you take a closer look, 
you’ll see that most philosophers of language either simply focus on other questions or behave as 
if they were primitivists about meaningfulness. Since our question could (and frequently is) mixed 
up with these other questions it is important to make clear how it differs from them. 
 Consider how Robert Stalnaker drew the standard distinction between two main types of 
questions in philosophy of language, those of descriptive semantics versus foundational or 
metasemantics: 
  
First there are questions of what I will call descriptive semantics. … A descriptive semantic 
theory assigns semantic values to the expressions of the language, and explains how the semantic 
values of the complex expressions are a function of the semantic values of their parts. … Second, 
there are questions, which I will call questions of foundational semantics, about what the facts 
are that give expressions their semantic values, or more generally, about what makes it the case 
that the language spoken by a particular individual or community is a language with a particular 
descriptive semantics. (Stalnaker 1997: 535).11  
 
 
10 The question therefore presupposes that the notions of an expression, meaning, and public language are useful 
objects of study. For recent discussion and defense of the above perspective against Chomskyan and Davidsonian 
arguments see Stainton 2016. For an insightful discussion of how different notions of language can all be useful for 
one or other theoretical purpose in linguistics see Santana 2016. 
 




On this, entirely standard view, to provide a descriptive semantics for an expression is to describe 
its meaning by assigning it some sort of a semantic value (e. g. a referent, a truth-condition, 
intension, a structured proposition, a Kaplanian character etc.). More generally, to provide a 
descriptive semantics for a language is to provide a theory that describes the meanings of its 
expressions, usually by assigning some sorts of semantic values to the atomic expressions and 
explaining how the semantic values of complex expressions depend on those of the atomic ones 
together with their syntactic structure. In contrast, to provide a foundational or a metasemantics 
for an expression is to say what makes it the case or metaphysically determines that it has the 
meaning that it does, what grounds its meaning.12 More generally, to provide a foundational 
semantics for a language is to say what makes it the case that its expressions have the meanings 
they do. 
 Neither of these two types of questions in philosophy of language is identical to our 
question about the nature of meaningfulness. To do descriptive semantics is clearly not to try to 
answer our question. Rather, when doing descriptive semantics philosophers and linguistics 
usually presuppose something about how their preferred semantic values are related to meanings. 
For example, it’s standardly taken for granted that there’s a connection between a sentence’s 
meaning and its truth and thus, that we get at least some information about a sentence’s meaning 
by stating its truth-conditions.13 However, what is presupposed might be very general and 
compatible with lots of different views about the nature of meaningfulness, even if it rules out 
some. 
Of course, one would rather expect that our question is discussed under the rubric of 
foundational semantics. However, to ask about the determination or grounding of meaning-facts 
either in general or about particular expressions is not to try to answer our question about the nature 
 
12 Unless further distinctions are drawn and use is regimented, it’s natural to take the notions of making the case, 
metaphysical determination, and grounding to be equivalent, and inverse to the notion of in virtue of. All of these are 
standardly taken to be relations between facts (Audi 2012: 686, Rosen 2010). A set of facts A makes it the case that f  
obtains, it determines or grounds f. Inversely, f obtains in virtue of A.  
 
13 In many writings Soames states the presupposed connection as follows: If ‘S’ means in L that p then ‘S’ is true-in-
L iff p (e. g. Soames 1992: 17). Heim & Kratzer start their standard textbook in linguistic semantics by saying “To 
know the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth-condition.” (Heim & Kratzer 1998: 1). On a different conception 
of orthodox frameworks in descriptive semantics they’re entirely formal and claims like the above are a further 
interpretation (e. g. see the discussion of how semantic values relate to meaning in Perez Carballo 2014: 132-135, 




of meaning either.14 It is easiest to see this if you consider the fact that primitivism about the nature 
of property x is compatible with a substantive story about x-making, determination, or grounding. 
For example, take theories of the nature of truth and theories of truth-making. One could be a 
primitivist about truth yet think that there’s a theory to be had as to what makes different sorts of 
true propositions true or what grounds the truth of propositions. Conversely, one could adopt a 
reductive analysis of truth without thereby settling all questions about truth-making. The same 
applies in the case of theories of the nature of meaningfulness and foundational semantics (= 
theories of meaning-making). One could be a primitivist about meaningfulness yet think that 
there’s theory to be had as to what makes expressions in general or particular expressions mean 
what they do or what grounds facts about meaning. In fact, this is exactly what Paul Horwich 
seems to think. Horwich is a sort of deflationary primitivist since he thinks that meaningfulness 
has no nature or essence and thus no analysis of meaningfulness is to be had, but just a story about 
determination (see Horwich 1998: 6, for discussion see Greenberg 2014: 178-179). Conversely, 
one could adopt a reductive analysis of meaningfulness without thereby settling all questions about 
meaning-making.  
 The primary purpose of this section has been to introduce the question about the nature of 
meaningfulness and make sure it won’t be mixed up with the question about meaning-making.15 
Let’s proceed now to discussing the answer in terms of rules of use.  
 
 
14 Questions about the nature/essence and grounding were frequently talked about using the same terminology in the 
not-so-distant past and they were sometimes even ran together. For example, Paul Horwich says that his interest is in 
the nature of meaning but insists that no analysis is possible and proceeds instead to offer a theory of what determines, 
or, in his terms, ‘engenders’ the meanings of particular terms (Horwich 1998). These days it is widely acknowledged 
that questions about nature/essence and grounding are different sorts of questions though, of course, not unconnected 
(Rosen 2010). Questions about nature/essence are usually taken to be questions about properties and their asymmetric, 
reductive analysis in terms of other properties and structure (e. g. Schroeder 2007: Ch. 4). In contrast, questions of 
grounding are questions about facts and what other facts ground these facts. See also fn. 15. 
 
15 The questions aren’t always mixed up. Alexis Burgess and Brett Sherman distinguish between the two in the 
introduction to their edited volume on metasemantics by separating basic metasemantics which asks questions about 
meaning-making from what they call, following Dummett, ‘theory of meaning’ which asks questions about the nature 
of meaning. (Burgess & Sherman 2014: 10). As evidence of relative neglect of the nature/essence question in the field 
I offer the fact that only one of the papers out of the 13 in their volume is centrally on the nature of linguistic meaning, 
namely Alejandro Perez Carballo’s paper on the proper understanding of expressivism. Note that Perez Carballo also 
distinguishes between a nature-related question, one about interpreting descriptive semantics (the ‘hermeneutic’ 
question) and the meaning-making question (‘the explanatory’ question) (Perez Carballo 2014: 135). Mark 
Greenberg’s two-part contribution in the volume is also on a nature question, but it focuses on conceptual content and 
not linguistic meaning (Greenberg 2014). Importantly, like us here, Greenberg also distinguishes between 





To understand how having a meaning could be a matter of being governed by a rule of use we can 
start with the familiar parallel between games like chess and languages like English. Both are 
constituted by a set of intrinsically inert things that have somehow acquired some “significance”. 
For example, chess is at least partly constituted by the inert things – the pieces of the game – that 
have somehow acquired what we could call their “roles” in the game. Similarly, English is at least 
partly constituted by inert symbols – the expressions of the language – that have somehow acquired 
meanings. In the case of games, it’s commonplace to think that they wouldn’t exist and playing 
them wouldn’t be possible if their rules weren’t in place. Thus, it is commonly said that they are 
at least partly constituted by their rules. And the way the rules are thought to constitute the games 
is by giving the pieces their roles. The basic thought behind our idea as an answer to the question 
about the nature of meaningfulness is that, similarly, languages like English wouldn’t exist and 
speaking them wouldn’t be possible if their rules weren’t in place. It can therefore be said that they 
are also at least partly constituted by their rules. And the way the rules can be thought to do this is 
by giving the expressions their meanings. 
 This basic sketch raises several questions which need to be answered to develop the idea 
into an actual view: 
 
 Q1) What is meant by a ‘rule’, here? 
 Q2) How do rules give expressions their meanings?  
 Q3) How do rules constitute languages? 
 
Let’s start with the first question. There are at least three related, but different ways of using ‘rule’ 
in philosophy.16 In a very broad sense used by Wittgenstein in his discussion of rule-following, a 
rule is anything that can be followed such that: 
 
a) our having, grasp or use of it can play a role in generating and explaining our action. 
b) our actions can accord or discord with it; 
  
 
16 I’m relying here on the view developed at length in Reiland 2020. 
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Here are some of Wittgenstein’s examples of rules in this sense: intentions, requests, and orders, 
and functions and properties used as principles for doing something. There is also a considerably 
narrower sense of ‘rule’ used in ethics, practical reason, epistemology etc. that differs in two key 
respects. First, rules in this sense must be general in applying to more than one instance. Second, 
the accord or discord they feature is distinctively normative (or, even more specifically, deontic).  
  Consider a moral rule and a traffic rule: 
 
(No Murder) Murder is prohibited. 
(No Right) If there’s a red light, turning right is prohibited. 
 
Like rules in the broadest sense, these can be followed. However, what’s different in this case is 
that when we break No Murder we’re not merely doing something incorrect or using a different 
principle, we’re doing something we mustn’t do, something that’s morally prohibited. Similarly, 
when we break No Right, we’re doing something we mustn’t do, something that’s legally 
prohibited. 
 A ‘rule’ in this narrower sense is something general that can be followed and where the 
accord and discord is distinctively deontic. To regiment usage, let’s call such things norms. Norms 
have propositional content that attributes to some action-type A (e. g. murder, turning right) some 
deontic status D (required, prohibited, permissible) perhaps on certain general conditions C (if 
there’s a red light). They can therefore be written down in one of the following two ways which 
we can think of normal forms for norms: 
 
(N1)   (If/only if/iff C), doing A is required/prohibited/permissible 
(N2)   a (a must/can’t/may do A (if/only if/iff C)) 
 
The only difference between these two forms is that the latter allows us to quantify over agents 
and use deontic modals.  
 Norms are general and normative. However, there is an even narrower sense of ‘rule’ that 
is central to philosophy of law, philosophy of games and sport, and us here. Rules in this sense are 
norms that are man-made in that they’re in force due to agential activity and therefore contingently. 
For example, laws are rules in this sense because they’re in force due to the fact that an authority 
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has enacted them or put them in force. Similarly, social norms are rules in this sense because 
they’re in force due to the fact that they’re accepted as being in force in a community (BEGS 
2013). 
 To see the difference between norms that are not rules in the narrowest sense and norms 
that are, compare No Murder to No Right. Like other moral norms, No Murder is not usually 
thought to be in force contingently. For it to be “in force” is just for its content to be necessarily 
true. In contrast, No Right is a rule in New York City, but not in most places in Europe or in Los 
Angeles. This is because the relevant authority in New York City has enacted it or put it in force 
there, but the relevant authority in the other places hasn’t done so. And for it to be in force is not 
for its content to be true, but rather for it to have been enacted and/or accepted. 
 Rules in the narrowest sense have propositional content, they’re not just the bare 
propositional contents themselves. They can be thought of on the model of judgments and 
assertions. Distinguish between particular datable and locatable acts of judging and asserting from 
judgments and assertions in the sense of propositions as judged or asserted. We can model the 
latter by using Frege’s use of the assertion-sign ‘├’ together with ‘p’, a variable over propositions. 
Every asserted proposition ‘├p’ can be divided into two components: its assertive force ‘├’ and 
its content ‘p’. Rules are propositions that are in force and they allow for a similar separation 
between their being in force and their content. For example, the bare propositional content that 
murder is permitted is not in force and therefore not a rule, even though it is of the right type in 
attributing an action type a deontic status. 
 It’s an interesting question what it is for rules to be in force. My own preferred view is that 
it is for them to be enacted and/or generally accepted (BEGS 2013, Reiland 2020). To make a rule, 
to enact, to put one in force, is not to judge or assert. To use Austin’s terms, to judge and assert is 
to do something constative: it is to take a stand on how things already are and thus to do something 
that has a mind-to-world direction of fit. In other words, it is to do something that has to fit pre-
existing reality in order to be correct. This is why judgments and assertions themselves can be said 
to be true or false (and not just their contents). In contrast, consider declaring a session open by 
the use of a sentence like ‘The session is open’ (as opposed to using what Austin called an explicit 
performative like ‘I open the session’). To declare a session open by the use of such a sentence is 
to do something performative: it is to seek to bring into existence a truth and thus do something 
that lacks a mind-to-world direction of fit. In other words, it is not to report on pre-existing reality, 
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but to seek to change it (Recanati 1987: Ch. 6). To enact is similarly to do something performative, 
to seek to bring into existence a normative truth. This is why enactments can’t be said to be true 
or false (even though their contents can). 
 It follows from this that sentences of the above two normal forms can be used for two 
different purposes when it comes to rules. They can be used to report rules that have already been 
enacted and are in force. For example, if one uses them while writing a newspaper article and 
reporting a recently made law. Or they can be used to enact rules. For example, if one uses them 
in making a law. 
 Let’s also briefly discuss acceptance. Some social rules are in force not because an 
authority has enacted them, but because they’ve come to be generally accepted. It’s quite hard to 
say exactly what acceptance in a community or even by a person amounts to (see Hart 1961: Ch. 
5). However, a promising Hartian idea is that for a person to accept a rule is for her to have certain 
normative attitudes: to have beliefs which mirror the content of the rule, to be disposed to evaluate 
actions in the light of the rule, to disapprove of breakings, to let others evaluate their actions in the 
light of it etc. (BEGS 2013: 28-31). This will suffice for us here. 
 
3. Rule-Governance View 
 
Let’s now proceed to the second question: how do rules of use give expressions their 
meanings? Consider how rules of games give pieces their roles.  For example, rules of chess do 
this by telling us when it is permissible to move pieces: they specify the conditions in which it is 
permissible for a player to move pieces. Similarly, rules of use can be taken to tell us when it is 
permissible to use expressions: they specify the conditions in which it is permissible for a speaker 
to use the expressions. The normal form for stating such rules is the following (using s for speakers, 
e for expressions and C for use-conditions): 
 
s (s may use e iff C) 
 
Then we can think of the expression’s meaning as its use-condition C. 
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 To have a toy example to work with, keeping it as simple as possible for the time being, 
consider the expressive ‘Ouch!’. Plausibly, the rule governing its use in English is something like 
the following: 
 
(Ouch!) s (s may use ‘Ouch!’ iff s is in pain) (Kaplan MS) 
 
How does this rule figure in language use? The idea is that speakers that are fully competent with 
English have a grasp on it. When a speaker utters ‘Ouch!’ and is speaking literally, the rule is in 
force for them (more on this below) and that’s why they count as using the expression with its 
meaning and expressing pain. When they are in pain their use is correct or permissible, in 
accordance with the rule. When they are not in pain this doesn’t mean that they didn’t use it with 
their meaning nor that they didn’t express pain! Rather, they did all of this, but just misused the 
expression, used it incorrectly or impermissibly, perhaps to intentionally deceive (Reiland 2021).17  
 Let’s proceed to the final question. How do rules constitute languages? What is it for rules 
like the Ouch! to be in force for speakers? This will also give us the opportunity to explore some 
possible differences between games and languages. 
The basic idea is that rules constitute any activity by being in force (Alston 2000, Garcia-
Carpintero 2021, Glüer & Pagin 1999, Reiland 2020, Williamson 1996). Following David Lewis’s 
view of languages, we can think of a game like chess as a set of pieces together with their roles in 
the game (Lewis 1975). Of course, since intuitively most games don’t cease to exist when one 
piece changes its role, it’s more natural to think of games as evolving entities that are at each 
moment fully constituted by “Lewisian” games or game-stages, but that could at the next moment 
 
17 Here’s an objection that frequently crops up in discussion. Namely, that this can’t be the rule since what it says is 
false. There are situations where you’re not permitted to utter ‘Ouch!’ even if you’re in pain (e. g. etiquette demands 
that you should be silent). And there are situations where you’re permitted to utter ‘Ouch!’ even if you’re not in pain 
(e. g. an evil demon forces you to do it). 
This objection relies on the mistaken assumption that for rules to be in force, what they say has to be true. 
Something like this assumption is related to what Hart saw as the basic error of those who ran law together with 
morality (Hart 1961). It would entail that there can’t be any immoral laws, odious rules of games etc.  
Rather, for rules to be in force is for them to be enacted or accepted and this is of course done for reasons. 
But once a rule is in force, it remains in force, even if you have overwhelming reason to do the opposite in the current 
situation. For example, consider the traffic rule that you’re not permitted to cross an intersection when a red light is 
on. Sometimes we have overwhelming reason to do so, for example, since there’s nobody in sight or we’re rushing to 
save a life. But the traffic rule remains in force nevertheless and you count as breaking it. Similarly, Ouch! can remain 




be fully constituted by a different one (Ridge 2020, Williamson 1996: 490). It is then the 
“Lewisian” games that we can think of as sets of pieces together with their roles. Now, on a rule-
based view of games, a “Lewisian” game is nothing but a set of propositional contents of the right 
sort like: 
 
(Pawn) a (a may move a pawn two squares forward only if it hasn’t moved) 
 
To start playing a game at a time is to take the contents and put them in force for ourselves at the 
time plus some further conditions like perhaps aiming to win. Thus, a game by itself is just a mere 
set of propositional contents of the right sort. However, to play a game at a time is to perform the 
relevant antecedent actions while treating these contents as rules.  
 In the case of games, it’s natural to think that starting to play at all and which game we 
play is a matter of voluntary decision. Contrast this with Williamson’s view of assertion. He 
conceives of asserting as a matter of default presumption. As he puts it: “In natural languages, the 
default use of declarative sentences is to make assertions” (Williamson 1996: 511). The idea is 
that whenever we say things, the rule of assertion is in force by default. This would have to be 
because it is somehow generally accepted among speakers of any language. Hence, to assert you 
don’t have to put it in force at the time of saying. Rather, you merely have to continue accepting 
it as being in force at the time of saying. You could opt out or discontinue the acceptance by 
indicating that you’re merely saying things or rather conjecturing or guessing etc. For example, 
you could do this by using an explicit performative like ‘I conjecture…’ (Williamson 1996: 496). 
However, to assert, to continue accepting the rule, you don’t have to do anything beyond not opting 
out. 
Now, we can think of “Lewisian” languages or language-stages similarly as sets of 
expressions together with their meanings.  On the Rule-Governance view, a “Lewisian” language 
is nothing but a set of propositional contents of the right sort like Ouch!. But should we think of 
speaking a particular language as being more like playing a game in being a voluntary decision or 
more like assertion in being a matter of default presumption? 
 Perhaps there is an element of both. On the Rule-Governance view what makes certain 
noises, what Austin called mere phonetic acts, into full-blown cases of speaking a particular 
language, is the fact that the rules are in force. Some might think it’s up to the speaker to signal 
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that they’re accepting the rules. However, it might be more plausible to think that whether we 
speak a language at all and which language we speak is a matter of default presumption. For 
example, when I utter ‘Ouch!’ in someone’s presence, there’s a default presumption that I’m not 
merely practicing pronunciation, but rather using it with its meaning in English. More generally, 
when a competent speaker uses expressions of a language in the presence of others then there 
seems to be a dual default presumption. First, that one is not merely uttering the expressions, but 
speaking a language. Second, that one is speaking some particular Lewisian language that is 
generally spoken in the community that the conversants are part of. In other words, there’s the 
presumption that one is speaking what Lewis called the language of the relevant community (Lewis 
1975).18  
 On this picture the rules of the particular Lewisian language that is the actual language of 
a community are in force by default in that community. They’re in force by default because they’re 
generally accepted in the community. Thus, if one is a competent speaker and a member of the 
community then to speak one doesn’t have to enact or put the rules in force at the time of the use. 
Rather, one merely has to continue accepting the rules as being in force. She could opt out or 
discontinue the acceptance for the time when it’s clear from the situation or by making it clear that 
she’s merely practicing pronunciation or testing a microphone (defeating the default presumption 
that she’s speaking a language). Similarly, she could opt out by making it clear that she’s engaging 
in linguistic innovation in trying to use a familiar word with a new meaning or when she’s speaking 
a different language which shares the same words (defeating the default presumption that she’s 
speaking the actual language). However, to speak, to continue accepting the rules, she doesn’t have 
to do anything beyond not opting out. 
 On the other hand, consider ambiguity. In that case it seems that the default presumption 
doesn’t do the trick by itself. Rather, the speaker has authority over which of the rules they accept 
at the time and can voluntarily choose, subject to the usual constraints on intention-formation. For 
 
18 I discuss the relation between Lewis’s view in terms of conventions and the view in terms of rules of use at length 
elsewhere. On one interpretation of Lewis, his view is a competitor to the Rule-Governance view which tries to get 
by with conventional regularities alone and in that case I think there are reasons to prefer the story in terms of rules. 
However, on another interpretation the views are not in tension since they’re about different aspects. The Rule-
Governance view reduces meaningfulness, something that Lewis took as a primitive, to rules of use while Lewis’s 
basic idea is that for particular rules to be in force in a community certain conventional regularities have to hold. 
Compare Nic Southwood’s view of laws as conventional norms which also argues that while laws aren’t reducible to 
conventions, what is it for them to be in force is for certain legal rules, the Hartian secondary ones, to be conventionally 
accepted because there’s a presumed practice of following them (Southwood 2019). 
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example, in uttering ‘Bertrand went to the bank’ I accept one of the two rules and this is what 
makes it the case that I say one thing and not the other. 
 To sum up, on the Rule-Governance view, languages are constituted by rules of use which 
give expressions their use-conditions (= meanings). And to speak some particular language is for 
its rules to be in force for you at the time, either by default presumption or voluntary decision.  
Hopefully, the above sketch suffices to convince you that the idea that meaningfulness is a 
matter of rules governing use can be made precise and de-mystified. Let’s now proceed to the 
standard objections. 
 
4. First Problem: Inconsistent with Truth-Conditional Approaches? 
 
In the 1970’s and later our idea came to be widely regarded as an alternative to and inconsistent 
with truth-conditional approaches in descriptive semantics. In this section I will show that this is 
based on a misunderstanding. The Rule-Governance view itself is completely neutral between 
truth-conditional approaches and alternatives, and thus entirely consistent with it.  
 Why would one think that our idea is inconsistent with truth-conditional approaches in the 
first place? To understand this, we need to know a bit more about Dummett’s work. Dummett 
questioned and rejected Donald Davidson’s view that to understand an expression is to know its 
evidence-transcendent truth-conditions (Dummett 1993, Davidson 1967). Since he was used to 
thinking of meanings in terms of use-conditions he instead claimed that the use-conditions for 
declarative sentences were anti-realist, evidence-immanent “truth”-conditions. Somehow this 
caused the impression that there are truth-conditional approaches on the one hand, and alternative, 
use-conditional, anti-realist approaches on the other. And this made it seem like these two 
approaches are inconsistent. 
 This is simply a misunderstanding. According to the Rule-Governance view, the meaning 
of a declarative sentence can be most straightforwardly described by stating the rule for its use by 
filling in the gap below: 
 




But the most common view among those who have held something like the Rule-Governance view 
is that in case of declaratives the use-conditions simply are truth-conditions! In fact, this was the 
view held by Alston, Stenius, Searle, and Dummett himself (he just disagreed over the nature of 
truth): 
 
(1) a (a may use ‘Bertrand is British’ iff Bertrand is British) (Alston 2000, Dummett 1991, 
Searle 1969, Stenius 1967: 268) 
 
This is by itself already enough to show that there’s no inconsistency. But the view is also entirely 
compatible with further, broadly truth-conditional approaches that trade in intensions or structured 
propositions. It just analyses the claim that ‘Bertrand is British’ expresses the proposition 
<Bertrand, being British> in terms of it being governed by any of the following rules which include 
more information about meaning while still containing the truth-conditional information: 
 
(2) a (a may use ‘Bertrand is British’ iff a believes <Bertrand, being British>) (Lewis 
1975: 7, Schroeder 2008) 
(3) a (a may use ‘Bertrand is British’ iff a judges <Bertrand, being British>) (Hanks 2015) 
(4) a (a may use ‘Bertrand is British’ iff a entertains <Bertrand, being British>) (Davis 
2003, Soames 2010) 
 
All of these hypotheses about what the use-conditions of declarative sentences are involve a 
propositional attitude. And proponents of all these views can maintain that on their view what it is 
for ‘Bertrand is British’ to semantically express <Bertrand, being British> is for it to have a use-
condition that involves this proposition’s being believed or judged to be the case, or entertained. 
Talk of semantic expression is nothing but shorthand way of talking about use-conditions while 
abstracting away the extra information about the attitude. 
 To sum up, the Rule-Governance view itself qua a view about the nature of meaningfulness 
is not at all opposed to “truth-conditional semantics” because it is simply neutral insofar as all 
views in descriptive semantics. It allows for hypotheses about the meanings of declarative 
sentences which are consistent with “truth-conditional semantics”. Of course, it also allows for 
hypotheses which are inconsistent with it, like, for example, expressivist views of normative 
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language (Schroeder 2008). But this doesn’t discredit the view at all. Rather it is a testament to its 
versatility in being consistent with different possible views in descriptive semantics.  
 
5. Second Problem: Frege-Geach? 
 
In the 1960’s and 70’s, largely due to Geach’s and Searle’s arguments, our idea came further to be 
seen as subject to the so-called Frege-Geach problem with compositionality (Geach 1960, 1965, 
Searle 1962). In this section I will show that this is also based on a misunderstanding. Again, the 
Rule-Governance view itself is neutral between views in descriptive semantics which are subject 
to the problem and views that are not, and it can easily allow for orthodox views not subject to the 
problem.  
The Frege-Geach problem is most fundamentally a problem for any view of the meaning 
of an expression that takes it to involve something forceful or attitudinal like a speech act or a 
mental state such that the force or attitude isn’t plausibly present when the expression is embedded 
in certain larger expressions. To take the simplest example, suppose you think that the meaning of 
‘Stealing is wrong’ is such that its use involves expressing the attitude of moral disapproval of 
stealing. Considerations of compositionality and logic require that it have the same meaning in ‘It 
is not the case that stealing is wrong’ or ‘Stealing is wrong or my parents lied to me’. But the use 
of these sentences emphatically doesn’t involve expressing moral disapproval of stealing. 
 Why would one think that thinking of meanings in terms of use-conditions is subject to the 
Frege-Geach problem in the first place? The primary reason is that in the 1950’s it became 
associated with certain non-cognitivist views in descriptive semantics that are subject to the 
problem. For starters, take Strawson’s short-lived view that ‘true’ is not a regular predicate which 
is for attributing the property of being true, but rather a device for endorsing (Strawson 1949). 
Strawson stated the view in terms of rules and use-conditions. On his view, the use-conditions of 
‘true’ are that you’re performing the non-cognitive act of endorsing. Thus, when you use the 
sentence ‘That is true’ you’re not saying that some relevant proposition has the property of being 
true, but rather endorsing it. Similarly, take Hare’s idea that ‘good’ is not a regular predicate which 
is for attributing the property of being good, but rather a device for commending (Hare 1952). 
Again, Hare stated the view in terms of rules and use-conditions. On his view, the use-conditions 
of ‘good’ are that you’re performing the non-cognitive act of commending. Thus, when you use 
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the sentence ‘Bertrand is good’ you’re not saying that Bertrand has the property of being good, but 
rather commending him.  
 This is how the idea in terms of rules became associated with non-cognitivist views. And 
these views are indeed subject to the Frege-Geach problem. Take the atomic sentence ‘Bertrand is 
good’. On Hare’s view its use-conditions are that the speaker is commending Bertrand. However, 
now take the complex sentence ‘It is not the case that Bertrand is good’. On the Rule-Governance 
view to use it permissibly one must use ‘Bertrand is good’ permissibly.19 However, it’s clear that 
the use-conditions of ‘It is not the case that Bertrand is good’ can’t involve the speaker’s 
commending Bertrand. Thus, non-cognitivists have at least a prima facie problem with accounting 
for the compositionality of meaning: they attribute meanings to expressions that seem like they 
couldn’t be the meanings of the same expressions when they occur as parts of certain more 
complex expressions. 
 To reiterate, the reason why the Rule-Governance view has been thought to be subject to 
the Frege-Geach problem is because it became associated with certain non-cognitivist views which 
are subject to the Frege-Geach problem. This generated the impression that the view itself is 
subject to the problem. But, again, this is a misunderstanding. The view itself qua a view about the 
nature of meaningfulness is neutral between different views in descriptive semantics. It is entirely 
consistent with the view that ‘true’ is a regular predicate which is for ascribing the property of 
being true and ‘good’ is a regular predicate which is for ascribing the property of being good. Of 
course, it also allows us to capture non-cognitivist views like Strawson’s and Hare’s which is why 
they used it to state them. But, again, this doesn’t discredit it at all. Rather it is a testament to its 
versatility in being consistent with different possible views in descriptive semantics. 
 
6. Unity of Meaning 
 
Let me finally explain why our idea has had a lasting appeal to philosophers from Strawson to 
Kaplan and why it is continually attractive. 
 
19 Here’s why. To use a complex expression with its compositional meaning requires using all of its parts with their 
meanings. However, now notice that on the Rules view to use any expression permissibly one must be in its use-
condition. This means that to use a complex expression with its compositional meaning and permissibly one must be 
in its use-conditions and the use-conditions of each of its parts. 
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 Start by thinking briefly about the nature of properties such as meaningfulness. For 
anything to have a property is for it to have something in common with other things that have that 
property. Thus, for expressions to have a meaning is for each of them to have something in 
common with other expressions that have a meaning. This is the thing in virtue of the possession 
of which they count as having a meaning or being meaningful. Let’s call this common feature X. 
However, for different expressions to have different meanings is for each of them to have 
something that it doesn’t have common with other expressions. This is the thing in virtue of the 
possession of which they count as having different meanings. Let’s call this differing feature Y.  
 The question what it is for an expression to have a meaning can now be broken down into 
the question about the nature of the common element, X, and the question about the nature of the 
differing elements, Y’s. Different views can be thought of as giving different answers to the 
question about the nature of X and the nature of Y-s. However, we can also now state a strong 
condition of adequacy on acceptable answers to the question about the nature of meaningfulness 
which I call the Unity Constraint. Namely, that any view of meaningfulness has to tell us what the 
nature of the common element X is and the nature of the differing elements Y’s are which is 
adequate for all the different types of expressions of natural language. Thus, it has to find an X 
which is the same not only in the case of names, predicates, and declarative sentences, but also in 
the case of indexicals and demonstratives, interrogative sentences, imperative sentences, and 
expressives and other similar phenomena. In general, it has to find an X which is the same in the 
case of all the different kinds of words, phrases, and sentences in natural language. If a view fails 
to do this then it makes meaningfulness a disjunctive property. And surely, such a view is 
unacceptable or at least in need of very serious justification. It is comparable to a view on which 
being red, being blue etc. are not ways of being colored, but rather on which to be colored just is 
to be red or blue etc. where there is no underlying unity to what is it to be red and what is it to be 
blue. We’d need very strong reasons to take such a disjunctive view of being colored seriously. 
Similarly, then, for a disjunctive view of meaningfulness.20 
 
20 This is entirely compatible with thinking that there are different aspects or dimensions of meaning that can formally 
treated separately or modeled with different theoretical tools. For example, in his influential unpublished paper Kaplan 
distinguished expressions which have meanings from those that have use-conditions and others have followed suit in 
distinguishing the truth-conditional and use-conditional dimension of meaning (Gutzmann 2015, Kaplan MS, Potts 
2005, Predelli 2013). The present proposal is that all meaning is, at bottom, use-conditional. However, this doesn’t 
mean that there is no semantic difference between primary, “at-issue” dimension of meaning determining what is said 
and secondary, “non-at-issue” dimension determining conventional implicatures, as carried by the underlined part in 
the sentence ‘Messi, who was at Barcelona, moved to PSG’ (Potts 2005). 
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 Now, consider the Rule-Governance view. On this view the common element X is 
embodied in the schema ‘s may use ‘_’ iff _’. And there’s no obstacle to this being the common 
element in the case of indexicals and demonstratives, interrogative and imperative sentences, and 
interjections. After all, we can easily see how all these expressions could have use-conditions. And 
this, I submit, is one of the reasons why something like the Rule-Governance view appealed to 




My aim in this paper was to reinvigorate the once-common idea that having a meaning is a matter 
of being governed by a rule of use and that meanings are to be thought of in terms of use-
conditions. I did this by sketching the Rule-Governance view and by dispelling certain common 
misunderstandings. I also demonstrated its lasting appeal by showing how it can allow for the 
meaningfulness of all expressions to consist in the same kind of property. In contrast, the venerable 
idea that meaningfulness consists in the potential to make a contribution to truth-conditions fails 
in this regard since many expressions don’t make such a contribution independently of context, 
and some don’t at all. 
Of course, I’ve only scratched the surface. For example, space didn’t permit me to go into 
how to translate the sort of compositional semantics that we have in terms of truth-conditions into 
use-conditions  (Heim & Kratzer 1998). Similarly, it didn’t permit me to fill in the details of some 
of the more exciting applications of the view to the semantics of mood, conditionals, slurs, and 
other similar phenomena. Nevertheless, I hope to have succeeded in showing that talk of rules of 
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